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THE CAMPAIGN TO RESTRICT THE RIGHTTO RESPOND TO TERRORIST ATTACKS IN SELF-DEFENSEUNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE U.N. CHARTER AND WHAT THEUNITED STATES CAN DO ABOUT IT Gregory E. Maggs* I. Introduction Article 51 of the United Nations Charter preserves the right of nationsto use military force in self-defense. The article says: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right ofindividual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occursagainst a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Councilhas taken measures necessary to maintain international peace andsecurity.1This broad language would appear to allow nations to use military forcein self-defense in response to “armed attacks” by terrorists. The UnitedStates has cited the article in explaining its use of force against terrorists,including its counter-attacks on al-Qaeda in response to the *150 1998bombings of its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania2  and the attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001.3 
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right of individual and collective self-defence following the armed attacksthat were carried out against the United States on 11 September 2001 . Id. 4 William H. Taft IV, International Law and the Use of Force, 36 GEO. J. Int’lL. 659, 659 (2005). 5 TIMOTHY NAFTALI, BLIND SPOT: THE SECRET HISTORY OFAM ERICAN COUNT ERTERRORISM  68-71 (2005). 6 Id. at 96-97. Sadly the New York bomb squad [was] not able to detonate the bomb safely, andone policeman died. The FBI negotiated with the hijackers and agreed to let themissue their statement as long as they promised to release the hostages unharmed. InFrance, after a two-day ordeal, the incident ended peacefully. The hijackerssurrendered and  were extradited to the United States. Id. 
A significant problem, however, has developed over the past twentyyears. In a series of resolutions and judicial decisions, as this essay willshow, organs of the United Nations have attempted to read into Article 51four very significant and dangerous limitations on the use of military forcein self-defense. These limitations find no support in the language of Article51, they do not accord with general principles of self-defense, and they areinimical to efforts to end terrorism. The United States needs to oppose limitations on the right of self-defense preserved by Article 51, not only for its own safety but also tofurther the most fundamental goals of the United Nations. As WilliamHoward Taft IV, the legal advisor to the U.S. State Department, has said:“One of the central purposes of the U.N. Charter is to prevent states fromattacking other states, and a state is surely less likely to attack another statewhen it credibly expects the use of force in response by the other state, orthe other state and its allies.”4 Unfortunately, the United States has only afew tools at its disposal for preserving its legal right to act in self-defense.The United States can use its veto power to prevent the Security Councilfrom condemning countries that properly use force in self-defense. It canalso use opportunities afforded by the U.N. Charter to express its interpre-tation of Article 51, thus establishing helpful precedent for future disputes.*151 II. The Use of Force Against Terrorism Before the mid-1980s, the United States already had experienced manyacts of international terrorism. In 1973, for example, Palestinian radicalskilled two U.S. embassy officials in Sudan.5  In 1976, Croatian nationalshijacked a TWA flight and planted a bomb in Grand Central Station.6  In
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7 See DAVID FARBER, TAKEN HOSTAGE: THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISISAND AMERICA’S FIRST ENCOU NTER WITH  RADICAL ISLAM 12-13(2004). 8 See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM 201-03(1990). 9 See N AFT ALI, supra note 5 , at 71-72; 96-97; 114; 134. 10 See id . at 114 . 11 See Mary Williams Walsh, Germany Finally to Try ‘86 Disco Bombing Case,L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1997, at A1 (summarizing the evidence that Germanprosecutors eventually gathered). 12 See id . 13 See Walter J. Boyne, El Dorado Canyon, 82 AIR FORCE MA GAZINE 56(Mar. 1999). 14 See N AFT ALI, supra note 5 , at 185 . 15 See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004)(prosecuting of defendant accused of participating in the conspiracy to commit theattacks of September 11, 2001); United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.
1979, Iranian militants took over the U.S. embassy in Tehran and held thestaff hostage for a year.7  In 1983, a suicide bomber destroyed the U.S.Marine barracks in Lebanon, killing over 200 persons.8 These were all horrible events. Yet the United States’ response to theseattacks was quite limited. Despite having the greatest military power in theworld, the United States did not react with armed force to these or any otherincidents of terrorism.9  Instead, the United States responded using onlydiplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and criminal law enforcementmeasures. True, the United States did attempt a military rescue of thehostages in Iran.10  However, it never undertook a counter-strike against thehostage takers. Seeing the ineffectiveness of previous responses, President Reagan gavecounter-terrorism efforts a new dimension in 1986. In April of that year,terrorists sponsored by Libya bombed a nightclub in Berlin, Germany. 11The explosion killed three people and injured 200 others.12  The casualtiesincluded U.S. service members stationed in Germany, whom the terroristswere targeting. Later that month, the United States struck back by bombingLibya’s terrorist training camps, military *152 headquarters, and theresidence of Libya’s dictator, Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi.13 The assault on Libya was the first overt use of military force by theUnited States in response to terrorism. 14 It was by no means the UnitedStates’ last. Since 1986, although the United States government hascontinued to prosecute some terrorists criminally,15  it has used military
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1999) (prosecuting of 10 defendants accused of conspiring commit terrorists actsin New York and elsewhere). 16 See Letter from Bill Richardson to Danilo Turk, supra note 2 (providing theofficial U.S. justification for the strikes on Afghanistan and the Sudan). 17 See Letter from Jeffrey De Laurentis, Chief of Section, Political andSpecialized Agencies, Permanent M ission of the United States to the UnitedNations, at Geneva addressed to the secretariat of the Commission on HumanRights, E/CN.4/2003/G/80 (Apr. 22, 2003) (expressing the official U.S. justificationfor the strike in Yemen). 18 For a complete description of the military responses to the attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001, see U.S. Dep’t of Defense, News about the War on Terrorism,http://www.defendamerica.mil. 19 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
force in response to several more incidents. Following the 1998 bombingof the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the United States firedmissiles at targets in Afghanistan and Sudan.16  After the bombing of theU.S.S. Cole in 2000, the United States used an unmanned Predator aircraftto strike and kill some of the suspected perpetrators as they were driving acar in Yemen.17  And the horrendous attacks of September 11, 2001prompted a massive and sustained use of military force in Afghanistan.18 III. The United Nations Charter As the United States has used military force in response to terrorism, animportant reality has become clear: The application of this force almostalways takes place in foreign countries. The terrorists who attack Ameri-cans are generally foreigners. They tend to strike Americans in foreigncountries, flee to foreign countries, and have support in foreign countries.The United States’ necessary resort to using military force in foreigncountries inevitably raises questions under the U.N. Charter. Part of thismultilateral treaty strives to curtail international warfare.  Arti*153 cle 2(4)says: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from thethreat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independ-ence of any state .”19  Through this article, the nations signing the U.N.Charter generally have agreed not to use military force outside their ownborders. But despite the general prohibition against the use of force in Article2(4), nations may use force abroad in three situations. First, members of theUnited Nations may use force in foreign countries if those countriesconsent. For example, for several years, the United States has had special
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20 U.S. Pacific Command, Combating Terrorism in the Philippines, http://www.pacom.mil/piupdates/index.shtml. 21 See Norman G. Printer, Jr., The Use of Force Against Non-State Actors underInternational Law: An Analysis of the U.S. Predator Strike in Yemen, 8 UCLA J.Int’l L. & FOREIGN  AFF. 331, 336 n.21 (2003). 22 See U .N. Charter art. 42. Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action byair, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore internationalpeace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and otheroperations by air, sea , or land  forces of Members of the United Nations. Id. 23 See Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Shifting Boundaries of the Right of Self-Defence-Appraising the Impact of the September 11 Attacks on Jus ad Bellum, 36 Int’l L.1081, 1090 (2002). 24 One critic has argued  that the United States itself prevented  the SecurityCouncil from authorizing the use of force against al-Qaeda under article 42. SeeGilbert Guillaume, Terrorism and International Law, 53  Int’l & COMP. L.Q. 537(2004) (“[W]hilst the United Nations was prepared to authorise military action bythe United States and its allies in Afghanistan, the United States was not looking forsuch authorization. It was seeking to act freely by invoking its inherent right of
forces assisting the government of the Philippines in fighting terrorists.20These forces are in the Philippines by consent and thus are not violatingArticle 2(4). Similarly, when the United States attacked members ofal-Qaeda in Yemen in response to the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000,the United States was acting with the consent of the Yemeni government.21But, of course, consent is not always possible. The leaders of al-Qaedaand the Taliban clearly did not welcome United States forces intoAfghanistan after the attacks of September 11. Libya did not inviteAmerican bombers after the Berlin nightclub bombing. Similarly, Sudandid not request the missile strike that occurred after the embassy bombingsin Africa. Second, Article 42 of the U.N. Charter says that nations can use forceoutside of its territory if the Security Council authorizes the use of force.22However, this provision, as a practical matter, does not offer much help tonations that wish to combat international terrorism. A sad reality is that theUnited States cannot count on the Security Council to authorize the use offorce against even the worst terrorists. In *154 fact, the Security Councilhas never used Article 42 to authorize force against terrorists,23  not evenafter the attacks of September 11, 2001.24 
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self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter.”) . But little evidence substanti-ates this view. 25 U.N. Charter art. 51. 26 Id. (“Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defenceshall be immediately reported to the Security Council .”). 27 See, e .g., Letter from Bill Richardson to Danilo Turk, supra note 2; Letterfrom John D. Negroponte to the President of the Security Council, U.N., supra note3. 28 Letter from Bill Richardson to Danilo T urk, supra note 2. 29 See infra part IV.A. 
Therefore, that leaves just the third alternative: Article 51 of the U.N.charter. Article 51 recognizes the possibility of using force in self-defensewhen the Security Council has not acted. As noted at the start of this essay,Article 51 recognizes the “inherent right of individual or collectiveself-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the UnitedNations.”25  As a practical matter, it is only this provision-Article 51-thatthe United States and other nations can cite to justify military action againstterrorists in a foreign country without the country’s consent. In fact, the United States has relied on Article 51 to support militaryactions that it has taken against terrorists in hostile countries. Article 51’ssecond sentence requires a nation acting in self-defense to inform thesecurity council of what it is doing.26  The United States has complied withthis provision by writing letters to the president of the Security Councilwhen it has used force.27  For example, when the United States firedmissiles at Sudan and Afghanistan after the 1998 embassy bombings inAfrica, the Ambassador of the United States to the United Nations wrotea letter to the President of the Security Council saying: “In accordance withArticle 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I wish, on behalf of myGovernment, to report that the United States of America has exercised itsright of self-defence in responding to a series of armed attacks againstUnited States embassies and United States nationals.”28 *155 IV. The Campaign to Limit the Right of Self-Defense An unfortunate situation has developed since the United States beganto use force against terrorists. The problem is that organs of the UnitedNations, such as the Security Council and the International Court of Justice,have creatively interpreted Article 51 to contain four restrictions on the useof force in self-defense. They have said Article 51 means that a nationcannot act in self-defense in response to an armed attack unless the armedattack is against the nation’s territory as opposed to it citizens or vessels.29They have said that Article 51 does not permit a nation to respond to an
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30 See infra part IV.B . 31 See infra part IV.C. 32 See infra part IV.D . 33 For discussion of two possible additional restrictions, see infra notes 49 and76. 34 See Associated Press, Israel Calls Bombing a Warning to Terrorists, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 2 , 1985, at A8. 35 See id . 36 See id . 37 S.C. Res. 573, P 7, U.N. Doc. 5/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985). 38 Id. at P  4. 
armed attack unless the attack had a traditional military character andcaused a significant amount of harm.30  They have ruled that Article 51means that a nation can use military force in self-defense only after it hasclear proof of the identity of the perpetrator of the armed attack. 31 Finally,they have asserted that a nation may act in self-defense only against nationsthat engage in terrorism, and not against non-governmental terroristorganizations.32  The following discussion describes these four creativerestrictions that the United Nations have attempted to impose.33  It explainswhy these restrictions would stand as an obstacle to the war on terror.Moreover, it demonstrates the reasons that they are legally unsound. A. The Attempt to Impose a Territorial Limitation In 1985, terrorists killed three Israelis on a yacht in Cyprus.34  Israelsuspected that agents of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) hadcarried out the attacks.35  In response, Israel bombed the PLO headquartersin Tunisia.36  Israel proclaimed that it was acting in self-defense to preventfuture attacks. The Security Council did not see it that way. The SecurityCouncil, with the United States abstaining, condemned Israel for its “act ofarmed aggression against Tunisian *156 territory” made “in flagrantviolation” of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.37 At the time, everyone could see that Israel was acting in self-defenseand that it wanted to prevent the PLO from striking again. Surely no onethought that Israel had initiated armed aggression against Tunisia withhopes of undermining Tunisia’s “territorial integrity or political independ-ence”38  in violation of Article 2(4). So why wouldn’t Article 51 authorizeIsrael’s response? The Security Council resolution contains no legalanalysis and therefore does not explain why the Security Council thoughtArticle 51 was not applicable. But the answer was apparent to observers:The Security Council did not believe that Israel could act in self-defense toan “armed attack” under Article 51 because the armed attack occurred in
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39 See Jochen Abr. Frowein, The Present State of Research Carried Out by theEnglish-Speaking Section of the Centre for Studies and Research, in LEGALASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 64 (1988). See also JacksonNyamuya Maogoto, Countering Terrorism: From Wigged Judges to HelmetedSoldiers- Legal Perspectives on America’s Counter-terrorism Responses, 6 SANDIEGO Int’l L.J. 243, 266-67 (2005) (discussing differing views on the issuewhether attacks on citizens of a nation outside its territory may constitute an “armedattack” on the nation). 40 The Security Council also  may have found article 51 inapplicable because itbelieved that Israel lacked proof of the PLO’s culpability and because Israel wasretaliating instead of acting in self-defense. See Wallace F. Warriner, The UnilateralUse of Coercion under International Law: A Legal Analysis of the United StatesRaid  on Libya on April 14, 1986, 37 NAVAL L. REV. 49 (1988). Neither of thesearguments seems much better. As part IV.C. explains, principles of self-defense donot require a victim to have proof of the identity of the perpetrator before takingactions in self-defense. And article 51 specifically contemplates that nations will usemilitary force in response to an armed attack; calling the counterstrike “retaliation”cannot negate Israel’s purpose of trying prevent future attacks by the PLO. 41 See G .A. Res. 41/38, P 11, U .N. Doc. A/RES/41/38 (N ov. 20, 1986). 42 See John A. Cohan, The Bush Doctrine and the Emerging Norm of Anticipa-tory Self-defense in Customary International Law, 15 PACE Int’l L. REV. 283, 323(2003) (noting that critics asked how “an ‘armed attack’ [could] exist in the isolatedmurder of American servicemen abroad”). 
Cyprus rather than in Israel. As Jochen Frowein put it, the Security Councilbelieved that “an armed attack cannot consist of a terrorist action againstcitizens on foreign territory.”39  The Security Council, in other words, musthave interpreted Article 51 to mean that the “armed attack” must occuragainst the territory of the nation wishing to exercise self-defense, notmerely against its citizens.40 The General Assembly apparently had the same view of Article 51 thefollowing year. In 1986, the General Assembly condemned the UnitedStates for bombing Libya in response to the attack on the Berlin nightclub.41 Like the Security Council, the General Assembly did not explain whyArticle 51 did not preserve the right of the United *157 States to take thisaction in self-defense. But again, no mystery surrounded the GeneralAssembly’s thinking. Observers recognized that the General Assembly wasinterpreting Article 51 to mean that a nation may not use self-defense inresponse to an “armed attack” unless the attack occurred against theterritory of the nation.42 The International Court of Justice also adopted this reading of Article51 in its decision in the Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic
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43 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. U. S.), 2003 I.C.J.161  (Nov. 6) [hereinafter Oil P latforms]. 44 See id . at 175 . 45 See id . at 185 . 46 See id . 47 Id. 48 Id. at 191. 49 The quoted paragraph also appears to state another restriction on the use offorce: A nation that has been subjected to an armed attack cannot respond unless itwas clearly targeted and not an unintended victim. See Natalia Ochoa-Ruiz &Esther Salamanca-Aguado, Exploring the Limits of International Law Relating tothe Use of Force in Self-Defence, 16 E UR. J. Int’l L. 499, 514 (2005). Thisrestriction also has no legal basis. Nothing in the text of article 51  says that a victim
of Iran v. U. S.).43  In the late 1980s, Iran was threatening oil shipments inthe Persian Gulf. The U.S. Navy went to the region to protect U.S.-flaggedvessels and to keep the peace. The Iranians then began laying mines ininternational waters and firing on U.S. aircraft.44  At one point, a missilecame from the direction of two Iranian oil platforms in the Gulf and strucka U.S.-flagged vessel.45  The United States responded by sending Navyships to destroy the platforms.46 Iran later sued the United States in the International Court of Justice.The United States’ defended on grounds that it was acting in self-defenseunder Article 51.47  But the International Court of Justice rejected thedefense on several grounds. Most relevant here, the Court said:On the hypothesis that all the incidents complained of are to beattributed to Iran the question is whether that attack, either in itselfor in combination with the rest of the “series of attacks” cited by theUnited States can be categorized as an “armed attack” on the UnitedStates justifying self-defence. The Court notes first that the Sea IsleCity was in Kuwaiti waters at the time of the attack on it, and that aSilkworm missile fired from (it is alleged) more than 100 km awaycould not have been aimed at the specific vessel, but simplyprogrammed to hit some target in Kuwaiti waters. Secondly, theTexaco Caribbean, whatever its ownership, was not flying a United*158 States flag, so that an attack on the vessel is not in itself to beequated with an attack on that State.48In this passage, the court concludes (1) that an attack against aU.S.-flagged ship is not an armed attack if it occurs in foreign waters (e.g.,the waters of Kuwait) and (2) that attacks on U.S.-owned property are notattacks on the United States.49  The court thus appears to believe that armed
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may respond in self-defense to an armed attack only if the perpetrator of the armedattack had a specific mens rea. And a restriction of that kind would make little senseas a matter of policy. If terrorist missiles are striking American vessels, the UnitedStates should have the right to stop them, regardless of whether the perpetrators arespecifically targeting the American vessels. 50 See supra part III. 
attacks must occur against the sovereign territory of a nation before thenation can exercise the right of self-defense under Article 51. Although the Security Council, General Assembly, and InternationalCourt of Justice all have interpreted Article 51 to permit nations to act inself-defense only when an “armed attack” occurs against the nation’sterritory, this interpretation finds no support in the language of Article 51.Article 51 identifies an “armed attack” as an event that would trigger a rightto act in self-defense. But it does not say that the armed attack must occuragainst the territory of the nation. Indeed, it is instructive to compareArticle 51 to Article 2(4). Article 2(4) specifically addresses action takenagainst “territory,” while Article 51 does not. So a reasonable interpretationis that Article 51 does not impose a requirement that an armed attack mustbe against a nation’s territory before the nation can respond in self-defense.The General Assembly, Security Council, and International Court ofJustice’s creative but erroneous interpretation of Article 51 also is inimicalto the United States’ efforts in combating terrorism. Most internationalterrorist strikes against the United States occur outside of its territory.Accordingly, if Article 51 contains a territorial limitation, the United Stateseffectively cannot use military force in response to terrorism; as explainedabove,50  the United States generally cannot act *159 without the consentof the nation hosting the terrorists or without the express approval of theSecurity Council. This is a serious problem. If the United States cannot use militaryresponses against terrorists located in foreign countries, the only remainingoption is diplomacy. But diplomacy works between governments, whichrepresent constituents and have long term interests. Groups like al-Qaedado not participate in it; and they certainly are not deterred by the prospectof diplomatic overtures. B. The Attempt to Impose a “Grave Harm” Limitation In addition to attempting to impose a territorial limitation, the Interna-tional Court of Justice also has attempted to engraft a “grave harm”limitation onto Article 51. This limitation would prevent a nation from
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51 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and AgainstNicaragua (Nicaragua v. U. S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].52 See id . at 119 . 53 See id . at 119-20. 54 See id . at 118 . 55 See id. Nicaragua argued that the United States’ action violated U.N. Charterarticle 2(4) and principles of customary international law. But the InternationalCourt of Justice based its decision solely on principles of customary internationallaw. Id. 56 See id . at 119 . 57 Id. 58 See id . at 119-20. 59 See Sean D . Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” inArticle 51 of the U.N. Charter,  43 HARV. Int’l L.J. 41, 45 (2002) (“If theNicaragua Court’s decision still stands, then in an analysis under Article 51, onemust consider the scale of actions that might constitute  an armed attack.”); W .
responding in self-defense to any armed attack unless that attack has causedsignificant harm. A requirement of “grave harm” first appeared in the Case ConcerningMilitary and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaraguav. U. S.),51  which came before the International Court of Justice in 1986.Although this case did not involve terrorism, it did involve Article 51. Thecommunist Sandanista government of Nicaragua was supplying rebels inEl Salvador with arms to help them destabilize the government.52  Inaddition, Nicaraguans had made cross-border incursions into Costa Ricaand Honduras. 53 The United States came to the aid of El Salvador, CostaRica, and Honduras by mining Managua’s harbor and taking other militaryactions.54 Nicaragua sued the United States in the International Court of Justice,claiming that the United States’ use of force was unlawful.55  The UnitedStates said it was acting in the collective self-defense of its allies,Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador, under Article 51.56  But the courtdid not accept the argument. Article 51 did not permit the United States todefend El Salvador because Nicaragua had supplied *160 only “anintermittent flow of arms,” not on a “scale of any significance.”57  Inaddition, the court ruled that the trans-border incursions by Nicaragua intoHonduras did not justify acting in self-defense because Honduras and CostaRica had not explained the facts of the incursion or why they consideredthemselves victimized by them. 58 In other words, even if a nation is thesubject of an armed attack, it cannot use military force in self-defenseunless the armed attack caused substantial harm.59 
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Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 HOUS. J. Int’l.L. 3, 37 (1999) (“The court’s approach to a right of unilateral response would seemto depend on the amount of destruction wrought: if a terrorist attack, whatever itsintention, succeeded in killing only two peop le, it would not warrant unilateralresponse, but if it killed thousands, whatever its intention, it would.”). 60 Oil Platforms, supra note 43, at 191. 61 As one writer has elaborated: The only way to prevent future acts of terrorism is to eliminate the supportwithout which terrorists cannot act: the financial support, the training bases, thesafe houses. Every state, every group that provides such support must be put onnotice to stop, and that if it does not, we will use whatever force is necessary todo so. This is not retaliation or anticipatory self-defense. There is a continuingimminent threat to the United States. Malvina Halberstam, The U.S. Right to Use Force in Response to the Attacks on
The court reiterated and amplified this creative limitation on the rightto use force in self-defense in the Oil Platforms Case. In addition toasserting the territorial limitation described above, the court said: Even taken cumulatively these incidents do not seem to the Court toconstitute an armed attack on the United States, of the kind that the Court,in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and againstNicaragua, qualified as a “most grave” form of the use of force ....60 I nother words, even though Iran may have sunk a ship and fired on othervessels, it had not caused enough harm to warrant an action in response. The magnitude limitation, like the territorial limitation, is inimical to thewar on terrorism. A threat may exist-and may require a response-even if anarmed attack fails to cause significant harm. To see this point, suppose thaton September 11, 2001, the same al-Qaeda hijackers had attempted to takeover and crash the same aircraft, but through some miracle, they failed intheir mission because passengers and the airline crews immediately hadsubdued them. In that case, the United States still would have suffered anarmed attack, but the magnitude of harm actually caused by the attackwould be minuscule. *161 Under the facts of this hypothetical and the International Court ofJustice’s restrictive view of Article 51, the United States could not respondby using military force against al-Qaeda. This conclusion is not sensible.The future threat posed by al-Qaeda would be no less, whether byhappenstance the nineteen hijackers had succeeded or failed. Furthermore,the United States would have just as much reason to go to Afghanistan andother foreign countries to eradicate the threat that al-Qaeda posed.61 
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the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, 11 CARDOZO J. Int’l & COMP. L. 851,861-62 (2004). 62 See John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 (2004). “Article 51copies the domestic system’s rule of self-defense in cases in which the governmentcannot bring its power to bear to prevent illegal violence.” Id. at 738. 63 Model Penal Code § 3.04  (2001). 64 What if American terrorists struck targets in a foreign country? Could theforeign country attack the United States in self-defense under article 51? Theforeign country most likely would not need to take military action because theUnited States (unlike Libya, Iran, or other terror-sponsoring nations) surely wouldtake immediate action against the terrorists. But if the United States for some reasondid not act, then a foreign nation could and  should use military force in self-defenseunder article 51. 
The International Court of Justice’s interpretation of Article 51-that onlyarmed attacks that cause significant harm permit military responses-findsno support in the text of Article 51. Indeed, it is contrary to the article’sbasic purpose. Article 51 is a provision about self-defense, not aboutrevenge. It is a provision about preventing future harm, not about eveningthe score. The goal is not to ensure that the victim’s response matches theterrorist’s act but instead to ensure that the victim can take steps to preventfuture attacks that may occur. By way of comparison, consider how the criminal law addressesself-defense. 62  The Model Penal Code says: “[T]he use of force upon ortoward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such forceis immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against theuse of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.”63  Thesame general principle should apply under Article 51: A nation may useforce when it reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessaryto protect itself from unlawful force by terrorists. In other words, thequestion should not be how many service members did Libya actuallysucceed in killing in Berlin or did al-Qaeda manage to kill on September11, 2001. The question should be whether the United States, having seenwhat happened in these attacks, believes that military force is necessary tostop future threats. Armed *162 attacks by terrorists may demonstrate theexistence of a threat, regardless of the magnitude of injury that theyactually cause. In some instances, ordinary law enforcement meth-ods-extradition requests and so forth-simply will not be enough even ifsubstantial harm has not already occurred.64 C. The Attempt to Require Clear Proof of the Perpetrator 
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In the Oil Platforms Case, as described above, the United Statesretaliated against Iran after a missile struck a U.S.-flagged vessel inKuwaiti waters. The International Court of Justice, as noted, rejected theUnited States’ argument that it was acting in self-defense in part becausethe attack was not against the territory of the United States and in part,because it did not cause great harm.65  The International Court of Justicealso gave a third reason, namely, that the United States did not havesufficient proof that Iran had fired the missile. The court said: For present purposes, the Court has simply to determine whether theUnited States has demonstrated that it was the victim of an “armed attack”by Iran such as to justify it using armed force in self-defence; and theburden of proof of the facts showing the existence of such an attack restson the United States [I]f at the end of the day the evidence available isinsufficient to establish that the missile was fired by Iran, then thenecessary burden of proof has not been discharged by the United States.66The court then made the task of proof very difficult, if not impossible.The United States presented satellite photographs and expert testimony thatIran possessed missile-firing equipment at the oil platforms but the courtdid not find the photographs “sufficiently clear.”67  The United Statespresented eyewitness testimony of a Kuwaiti military officer who claimedto have seen the missile and observed its direction*163 of flight, but thecourt was not persuaded that he was credible.68  The court emphasized thatthe United States had not shown that the missile that struck the Sea IsleCity had sufficient range to have come from the oil platforms because theUnited States had “no direct evidence at all of the type of missile thatstruck the Sea Isle City.”69  (The court did not say where the United Statescould have acquired this evidence; indeed, this would probably beimpossible without the cooperation of the perpetrator given that the missilewould have disintegrated upon exploding.) The United States pointed outthat the President of Iran had threatened U.S. shipping in prior months,saying that “Iran would attack the United States if it did not ‘leave theregion.”’70  But the Court did not think that was sufficient. The UnitedStates showed that independent experts-“Lloyd’s Maritime InformationService, the General Council of British Shipping, Jane’s Intelligence
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Review and other authoritative public sources”71 -all had blamed Iran forthe attack, but the court did not know what evidence these sources hadrelied on and therefore thought that they might be wrong. From this case comes the principle that a nation cannot defend itselfunder Article 51 unless, and until, it has some high degree of proof of theidentity of the perpetrator. This second restriction, like the first, has terriblepractical effects. It is likewise wrong as a legal matter. The practical consequences of this restriction are easy to see. How is anation supposed to come up with clear proof? Iran certainly did notphotograph the firing of the missile or admit responsibility. No perpetratorof such an act would do that. Consider the attacks of September 11. Did theUnited States have clear and convincing proof that Bin Laden wasresponsible when the United States sent forces to Afghanistan? The UnitedStates did not acquire the videotape of Osama bin Laden bragging about theincident until weeks later. But it never would have gotten that evidence ifit had not counterattacked. Indeed, nations that follow the Oil Platformsdecision hardly ever will be able to use Article 51 to mount an immediatecounterattack when struck by terrorists. This interpretation of Article 51 also does not square with ordinaryself-defense principles. A person acting in self-defense does not need *164to have clear proof. Again, the Model Penal Code says that the standard iswhether the person believes that force is necessary to prevent immediateharm.72  Surely, the United States reasonably could and did believe that itwas necessary to strike Iran given all the provocation. True, mistakes may happen, but the law of self-defense has never soughtto prevent all mistakes. In the criminal law context, a victim does not evenneed to use force against the right person. In one criminal case, forexample, a woman thought she was about to be attacked by her brother-in-law. She wanted to shoot him but accidentally killed her sister. Neverthe-less, the court said that was still self-defense.73  Requiring individuals ornations to wait for perfect proof of the identity of the perpetrator of anarmed attack before acting in self-defense may negate their right ofself-defense altogether. D. The Attempt to Prohibit Self-Defense Against Non-States 
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74 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9) [hereinafter AdvisoryOpinion]. For an excellent and detailed analysis of the case , see Sean D. Murphy,Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?,99 AM. J. Int’l L. 62  (2005). 75 See Advisory Opinion, supra note 74, at 194-95. 76 See id. The Court’s opinion also might imply yet another restriction on the useof self-defense under article 51: A nation can only use violent means of acting inself-defense under article 51 and that non-violent means-like building a fence-oddlyare not justified. See Robert A. Caplen, Note, Mending the “Fence”: HowTreatment of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict by the International Court of Justiceat the Hague Has Redefined the Doctrine of Self-Defense, 57 FLA. L. REV. 717,762-63 (2005). 77 See Advisory Opinion, supra note 74, at 170-72. 78 Id. at 171. 79 Id. at 141. 80 See id . 81 Id. at 197. 
In its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Constructionof a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,74  the International Courtof Justice attempted to impose yet another restriction on the inherent rightof self-defense preserved in Article 51. The court ruled that a nation mayact in self-defense only when attacked by another nation.75  A nation, thecourt said, cannot use force to defend itself against attacks by a mereterrorist organization.76 The opinion concerned Israel’s efforts to build a security barrier toprevent suicide bombers and other terrorists from entering Israel from theoccupied territory of the West Bank.77  The security barrier, as planned,would run along Israel’s borders with the West Bank. The *165 barrier alsowould enter the occupied West Bank in many places, enclosing territorythat does not belong to Israel. Opponents of the planned security barrier argued in part that it wouldviolate Article 2(4) because it would amount to an acquisition of territoryby force; Israel, they asserted, was taking parts of the West Bank territoryby forcibly building the security barrier.78  The U.N. General Assemblyasked the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on thelegality of Israel’s plan.79  The International Court of Justice said thatbuilding the fence was an unlawful use of force in the West Bank.80  Itrejected Israel’s argument that it was building the fence in self-defenseunder Article 51.81  The court said “Article 51 of the Charter recognizes theexistence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by
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one State against another State.”82  Israel could not rely on the article,according to the court, because the terrorist groups attacking Israel are not“States.” The implications of this decision for the United States are staggering.The United States’ foremost enemy, al-Qaeda, is not a state. Therefore,under this decision, the United States could not respond with force to theattacks of September 11, 2001, or to the 1998 bombings of the U.S.embassies in Africa. On the contrary, any response would violate the U.N.Charter. The International Court of Justice did not overlook this consequence ofits decision. The sole dissenting member of the court, Judge ThomasBuergenthal, not only explained that restricting the right of self-defensewas an error, he specifically called the court’s attention to how the decisionwould make the United States’ military responses to al-Qaeda unlawful. 83But the court adhered to its views. Perhaps even more regrettably, a majority of the Security Councilappears to agree with the International Court of Justice. Immediately afterSeptember 11, the United States prodded the Security Council to act. TheSecurity Council adopted a diplomatically-worded resolution, ResolutionNo. 1368, condemning the attacks. 84 But the Security Council cagilyavoided saying that the United States had a right to defend itself underArticle 51. *166 The preamble to Resolution No. 1368 declares that the SecurityCouncil was “[r]ecognizing the inherent right of individual or collectiveself-defence in accordance with the Charter .”85  In other words, theSecurity Council acknowledged that the U.N charter contains a right to actin self-defense, something no one ever disputed. The Resolution, however,did not say what the right to self-defense entails. Most particularly, it didnot say that al-Qaeda had committed an “armed attack” for the purposes orArticle 5 and it did not say that the United States had a right to act inself-defense in response to the attack by al-Qaeda. In contrast, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had nodifficulty seeing the attacks for what they were. On October 2, 2001,NATO’s president issued this statement: 
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86 See Lord Robertson, Secretary General, NATO, Statement (2 October 2001),http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm. 87 See Carsten Stahn, Terrorist Acts as “Armed Attack”: T he Right toSelf-defense, Article 51 (1/2) of the UN Charter, and International Terrorism, 27FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 35, 42 (Fall 2003) (arguing that “[t]he term ‘armedattack’ was traditionally applied to states, but nothing in the Charter indicates that‘armed attacks’ can only emanate from states.”); Fr. Robert J. Araujo, S.J.,Implementation of the ICJ Advisory Opinion-Legal Consequences of the Construc-tion of a W all in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Fences [Do Not] Make GoodNeighbors?, 22 B.U. Int’l L.J. 349, 383 (2004) (“The article does not specify whomust be or can be the author of or be responsible for an attack that can triggerapplication of the self-defense provision.”); Barry A. Feinstein, A Paradigm for theAnalysis of the Legality of the U se of Armed Force Against Terrorists and StatesThat Aid and Abet Them, 17 TRANSNAT’L LAW . 51, 67-68 (2004) (“Nothingcontained in the United Nations Charter specifies that ‘an armed attack’ may onlybe perpetrated by a State, and Article 51 was drafted in a broad enough manner topermit the use of force in self-defense to counter non-state actors.”). 
The facts are clear and compelling. The information presented pointsconclusively to an Al-Qaida role in the 11 September attacks. We knowthat the individuals who carried out these attacks were part of the world-wide terrorist network of Al-Qaida, headed by Osama bin Laden and hiskey lieutenants and protected by the Taleban. On the bas i s  o f  th isbriefing, it has now been determined that the attack against the UnitedStates on 11 September was directed from abroad and shall therefore beregarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty [whichcreated NATO], which states that an armed attack on one or more of theAllies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack againstthem all.86 Why couldn’t the Security Council issue a similarly-wordedresolution declaring that al-Qaeda had committed an “armed attack”justifying the United States in acting in self-defense by attacking al-Qaeda?Presumably, a majority of the Security Council-or a member having a vetopower-did not agree with this conclusion. This fourth creative restriction on Article 51, like the other threepreviously discussed, also has no legal basis. As many others haveobserved, nothing in the language of Article 51 says that an armed *167attack must be by a state.87  And principles of self-defense generally focuson the perspective of the person or the nation threatened, not on the identityof the perpetrator. From the perspective of the nation threatened, it does notmatter whether the perpetrator is a state actor or a non-state actor. The goalis to provide self-protection. Indeed, diplomacy and other non-militaryactions are more likely to be effective with state actors than with non-state
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actors. So there may be a greater need to use military force in self-defenseagainst non-state-sponsored terrorists than against state-sponsoredterrorists. V. How the United States Should Respond The campaign to restrict the right to use force in self-defense underArticle 51 is clearly unacceptable to the United States and other nationsfacing the threat of international terrorism. The four restrictions that organsof the United Nations have attempted to impose would largely makemilitary responses to terrorism impossible. So what should the UnitedStates do about them? The United States has several options, although allof them have difficulties. A. Ignoring the Attempts to Impose Restrictions The first possible response is for the United States to ignore the fourrestrictions that the organs of the United Nations have attempted to imposeon Article 51. This response is not difficult, not unprecedented, and notunjustified. The U.N. General Assembly has passed all kinds of ludicrous resolu-tions. These resolutions have few practical consequences and gener-ally*168 just bring disrepute on the nations that vote for them. The UnitedStates, for this reason, did not care, and did not need to care, when theGeneral Assembly condemned it for bombing Libya in 1986.88  Nothingcame of the resolution. The Security Council’s resolutions have more force. But the UnitedStates holds a veto power on the Security Council. The United Statestherefore could veto any proposed Security Council resolution that mightcondemn defensive actions that the United States might take under Article51. The United States therefore does not need to ignore resolutions of theSecurity Council. That leaves only the International Court of Justice, and the United Statesalso can ignore its judgments. In fact, it already has done so. In theNicaragua case, the International Court of Justice ordered the United Statesto pay compensation to Nicaragua, but the United States refused to complywith the judgment.89  The U.N. General Assembly subsequently passed
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90 See G.A. Res. 41/31, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/31 (Nov. 3, 2001); G.A. Res.42/18, U.N . Doc. A/RES/42/18 (Nov. 12, 1987); G.A. Res. 44/43, U.N. Doc.A/RES/44/43 (Dec. 7, 1989). 91 See Letter from Secretary of State Schultz to  the Secretary-General of theUnited Nations (O ct. 7, 1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M . 1742 (1985). 92 See Tom Ruys & Sten Verhoeven, Attacks by Private Actors and the Right ofSelf-defence, 10 J. CON FLICT & SECURIT Y L. 289, 298 (2005) (discussing aproposal by the Australian Prime Minister to amend the U.N. charter to provideexplicitly that a nation has the right to attack terrorist groups in other countries). 
several resolutions urging the United States to comply immediately, 90 butthe United States ignored these resolutions as well. As a result of this case,the United States withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction of theInternational Court of Justice.91 Ignoring attempts to impose restrictions on the right of self-defense hasa legal basis. The U.N. Charter is a multilateral treaty. The United Statessigned this treaty, agreeing to abide by Article 51 and the other articles inthe Charter. It did not agree to abide by the creative restrictions that organsof the United Nations have attempted to put on Article 51. The fourlimitations described above have no basis in the text of Article 51, and theyrun counter to generally accepted principles of self-defense. For this reason,the United States would be less faithful to the U.N. Charter if it agreed tofollow the four restrictions than if it simply ignored them. For these reasons, ignoring the creative restrictions that organs of theUnited Nations have attempted to impose on Article 51 is something thatthe United States can and should do. But ignoring the interpretations ofArticle 51 is not enough. Although the United States may have the fortitudeto ignore the General Assembly, the power to veto *169 Security CouncilResolutions, and the willingness to withdraw from the compulsoryjurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, many of the United States’allies do not. These creative restrictions on the right to exercise self-defense may prevent these allies from taking military action againstterrorists. In the global war against terrorism, this possibility would harmthe United States. B. Amending the United Nations Charter Another possible response would be for the United States to proposeamending Article 51 to make clear that the right to exercise self-defense isnot subject to the four supposed limitations described above. Some foreignpolitical leaders have expressed interest in this possibility.92  If the nations
THE CAMPAIGN TO RESTRICT THE RIGH T OF SELF-DEFENSE 21of the world could agree on amendments that would accomplish this goal,then the entire problem would disappear. Drafting an amendment would not be difficult. For example, the UnitedStates might propose adding a sentence at the end of Article 51 sayingsomething like the following: A Member of the United Nations that has suffered an armed attack is notinhibited from exercising its inherent right to use force in self-defensemerely because (1) the armed attack did not occur on or against the nation’sterritory; (2) the armed attack did not cause grave harm; (3) the Membercannot prove the identity of the perpetrator with certainty; and (4) thearmed attack was not state-sponsored. This amendment would neitherexpand nor contract the inherent right of self-defense that Article 51 strivesto protect. Instead, it simply would get rid of the creative limitations thatthe International Court of Justice and the other organs of the UnitedNations have attempted to place on the inherent right to self-defense. Unfortunately, this proposal has a clear problem. Amending the U.N.Charter in this manner would be politically impossible. Only the UnitedStates and a few other democracies both use military force to respond toterrorism and care about international law. The rest of the *170 worldeither does not fight terrorism with military force or does not heedinternational law. Most nations thus would see no reason to make changesto the U.N. Charter just to benefit the United States and a few othercountries. In fact, they likely would oppose it largely because the UnitedStates supports it. Indeed, proposing the amendment might cause more harm than good. Ifthe United Nations rejected the proposal (as it almost surely would),opponents of American policy subsequently might cite the rejection insupport of the four creative limitations discussed above. They might arguethat the rejection of the amendment shows that members of the UnitedNations favor the four restrictions. Although this argument lacks legalvalidity, it would not help the United States politically or diplomatically.C. Persuading the ICJ to Change its Interpretation The United States also might respond by attempting to persuade theInternational Court of Justice to change its interpretation of Article 51.However, this possible response also has problems. One is that the UnitedStates generally wants to avoid litigation in the International Court of
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93 Douglas J. Ende, Comment, Reaccepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction of theInternational Court of Justice: A Proposal for a New United States Declaration, 61WASH. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (1986) (“Perhaps the primary reason, similar to thatadvanced following the United States withdrawal from the litigation brought byNicaragua against the United States, is the administration’s belief that thecomposition of the Court is essentially hostile to United States interests.”). 94 See Advisory Opinion, supra note 74, Declaration of Buergenthal, J., at 201.95 Id. 96 See supra part IV.D. 97 See Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Defends Action in U.N. on Raid, N.Y. TIMES,Oct. 7, 1985, at A3 (reporting that Secretary of State George Schultz explained theUnited States’ action by stating the following: Reagan and other high officials had considerable sympathy for the Israeli
Justice, which it rightly considers a hostile forum.93  Another is that theInternational Court of Justice seems unlikely to listen to reason on thesubject of self-defense. In the Israeli Wall Case, as noted above, only one judge out of the totalof fifteen disagreed with the conclusion that using force was impermissibleagainst non-state actors.94  The dissenting judge, Thomas Buergenthal ofthe United Sates, explained the problem with the majority’s position in asimple and cogent manner.95  But the other members of the court wereunmoved. The likelihood of changing the views of the International Courtof Justice is thus very small. *171 D. Taking Action Through the Security Council The United States also might oppose these four restrictive interpreta-tions of Article 51 by using its permanent seat and veto power on theSecurity Council to influence the decisions of the Security Council. TheUnited States clearly does not have the political influence to persuade theSecurity Council to authorize the use of force against terrorists; its failureto get stronger wording in Security Council Resolution No. 1368 provesthis point.96  But there are three things that the United States can do. First, the United States can veto any resolutions that would condemn anation for using self-defense based on these four principles. For example,the United States should not have abstained from the resolution condemn-ing Israel for bombing the PLO headquarters in Tunisia after the PLO’sarmed attack in 1985. The United States disagreed with the decision of theSecurity Council and fully agreed that Israel had a right to defend itselfunder Article 51, but the United States at the time worried that vetoing theresolution would lead to anti-American riots in Tunisia.97  In retrospect, the
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action [but] there was overwhelming information suggesting that a UnitedStates veto would unleash leftist students and other groups into the streetsin Tunisia, perhaps to  destroy the American Embassy and perhaps tooverthrow the Government of President Habib B ourguiba.). 98 Michael Ross, Reagan Remarks on Raid Caused Shock; U.S.-Tunisian Ties:Irreparable Harm?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1985, at sec. 1, p. 13 (reporting that the“abstention and subsequent statements by Reagan have helped to cool Tunisiantempers, but officials here say they believe that the close relations that successiveU.S. administrations have had with Tunisia over the years have now come to anend.”). 99 See S .C. Res. 1368, supra note 84 (“The Security Counc il [u]nequivocallycondemns in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on11 September 2001 in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania and regardssuch acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peaceand security .”) . 100 See U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Measures taken by Members in the exercise of thisright of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council .”). 101 See Letter from Bill Richardson to Danilo Turk, supra note 2. My Government has obtained convincing information that the organization ofUsama Bin Laden is responsible for the devastating bombings of the United Statesembassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam. Those attacks resulted in the deaths of 12American nationals and over 250 other persons The Bin Ladin organization
abstention did not help the United States much in its relations withTunisia.98  In addition, the Security Council’s condemnation of Israel surelygave credence to the General Assembly’s view that the United States wasacting unlawfully when it used military force against Libya the followingyear. Second, the United States generally can persuade other members of theSecurity Council at least to condemn terrorist attacks. For example, theSecurity Council condemned al-Qaeda in Resolution No. *172 1368.99Certainly, al-Qaeda did not care about the condemnation from the UnitedNations. But the condemnation may encourage nations to take strongersteps against terrorist organizations. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the United States can use itscommunications to the Security Council to shape interpretations of Article51. As explained above, Article 51 contains a notice requirement: A nationmust provide notice when it uses force under Article 51.100  The UnitedStates typically has done this by writing a letter to the Security Council. Forexample, when the United States attacked targets in Afghanistan and Sudanafter the 1998 embassy bombings, it wrote a long letter listing al-Qaeda’sevil misdeeds.101 
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maintains an extensive network of camps in Sudan, which have been and are beingused to mount terrorist attacks against American targets. Id. 102 See, e .g., Erin L. Guruli, The Terrorism Era: Should the InternationalCommunity Redefine its Legal Standards on Use of Force in Self-Defense?, 12WILLAMETTE J. Int’l L. & DISP. RESOL. 100, 109 (2004) (arguing that article51 may permit a nation to act in self-defense against terrorists who are not a statein part on grounds that “the Security Council never expressed its disagreement whenthe United States informed the Council of its intention to exercise its ‘inherent rightof individual and co llective self-defense.”’). 103 See Guantanamo Bay De tainees  Lega l Updates , http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay_legal.htm. 104 See Human Rights News, Growing Problem of Guantanamo Detainees,http://hrw.org/english/docs/2002/05/30/usdom4007.htm. 105 See, e.g., Prosecution Response to Defense Motion: Armed Conflict inAfghanistan has Ended, n.11, United States v. Hicks, http:// alt.defenselink.mil/news/O ct2004/d20041026motion.pdf.
Letters of this kind have no binding effect by themselves. But interna-tional incidents are often judged in light of past practices. This tradition isuseful to the United States. The United States is one of the few countriesthat takes military action against terrorists in foreign countries. So it is oneof the few countries that sends formal notices to the Security Councilexplaining why it believes that an action in self-defense is necessary. Andbecause the United States has a veto power, the Security Council generallyhas no way to contradict the United States by passing a contrary resolution.Letters to the Security Council of this kind have been important already.Even now, scholars are drawing conclusions about the meaning of Article51 based on the Security Council’s non-reaction to the letter sent by theUnited States following the attacks of September 11, *173 2001.102  Theletters also may provide legal support for the United States’ positions inother contexts. For instance, military commissions in Guantanamo areseeking to try members of al-Qaeda.103  Some of the accused have disputedwhen al-Qaeda began or ended various conspiracies to violate the laws ofwar.104  But prosecutors have been able to cite letters sent by the UnitedStates to the Security Council under Article 51 addressing prior incidentslike the embassy bombings, thus providing evidence of the duration of thearmed conflict with al-Qaeda.105VI. Conclusion Article 51 of the U.N. Charter has great importance in the effort tocombat international terrorism. This article preserves the right to use
THE CAMPAIGN TO RESTRICT THE RIGH T OF SELF-DEFENSE 25military force in self-defense. The United States and other democraticnations must rely on Article 51 for authority to use military force againstterrorists in foreign countries. Because the Security Council is politicallyhostile, they cannot expect the Security Council to grant them the authorityto use force under any other provision of the Charter. Unfortunately, the International Court of Justice and other organs of theUnited Nations have attempted to impose four dangerous restrictions on theright to act in self-defense under Article 51. Cumulatively they have saidthat a nation may act in self-defense to an armed attack by terrorists onlyif the terrorist attack (1) occurred against the nation’s territory; (2) actuallycaused grave harm; (3) left sufficient evidence to allow the victim to provethe identity of the perpetrator in court; and (4) was done by a foreigngovernment as opposed to a nongovernmental*174 terrorist organizationlike al-Qaeda, Hamas, or Hizbollah. These four restrictions, if followed, would have the practical effect ofprohibiting most military responses to terrorism. In addition, if they in factwere the law, then the United States would have acted illegally indefending itself following terrorist attacks by Libya, Iran, and al-Qaeda.The United States and other nations that oppose terrorism cannot acceptthis understanding of the U.N. Charter. None of the four restrictions that the organs of the United Nations haveattempted to impose finds support in the language of Article 51. Indeed, thesimple language of Article 51 appears to preclude the restrictions for thereasons explained above. The restrictions also run contrary to generalprinciples of the law of self-defense. They seem to transform Article 51from a provision about acting in self-defense into a provision about eveningthe score in a game between equals. Unfortunately, the United States has limited options for opposing theserestrictive interpretations of Article 51. True, the United States generallycan ignore the General Assembly’s resolutions and can avoid the jurisdic-tion of the International Court of Justice. But realistically, the United Statescannot push through amendments to the U.N. Charter, cause the Interna-tional Court of Justice to change its views, or get authorization for the useof force from the Security Council. Still, the United States can use its veto power to prevent the SecurityCouncil from condemning countries that use force in self-defense. And itcan use opportunities afforded by the U.N. Charter to express its interpreta-tion of Article 51, thus establishing helpful precedent for future disputes.In particular, the United States can and should explain its understanding of
THE CAMPAIGN TO RESTRICT THE RIGH T OF SELF-DEFENSE26Article 51 every time it tells the Security Council that it is going to useforce in self-defense.
